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Abstract 
With growing interest in a universal basic income (BI), we provide new results  
for a majority to benefit from replacing (some) unemployment benefits with BI. Given 
any income distribution and an extensive margin, such a replacement always benefits 
those remaining unemployed, raises utilitarian welfare, and benefits a poor - or even a 
working - majority. Similar results follow with involuntary unemployment, and joint 
distributions of wages and costs of work. Moreover, using quasi-linear utility with 
intensive margins, marginal introduction of BI can still benefit a large proportion of the 
poor whose productivities are below the average, without raising unemployment.  
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 1 
As income and wealth distribution becomes increasingly skewed even in the most 
developed economies (Piketty 2014), while job security gives way to precarious 
employment for many, even better-educated workers (Standing 2011), the idea of a 
universal basic income (BI), unconditionally available for all citizens (also called a 
demogrant or citizen’s income), is receiving more attention in the media, political 
discussion, and academia. Such a radical proposition is not a recent innovation. A related 
experimental system of poor relief emerged in late 18th century England1, but was not 
welcomed by the first generation of economists. David Ricardo worried it would reduce 
the supply of agricultural labor. Thomas Malthus criticized it as likely to encourage 
population growth, especially of the poor. Jeremy Bentham believed it would discourage 
work, which is not only economically but also morally valuable. This negative consensus 
among classical economists was only contested at the time by contemporary political 
philosopher Thomas Paine (Agrarian Justice 1796).  
          As welfare systems were developed in the postwar decades, a few well-known 
economists such as James Meade and James Tobin suggested a BI, and Milton Friedman 
proposed the related negative income tax. In 1968 1,200 economists appealed to the US 
Congress for income guarantees. But Nixon’s “Family Assistance Program” marginally 
failed to pass the Congress next year and discussion of BI gradually disappeared. Today’s 
welfare systems, with increasing emphasis on wage subsidies for low wage workers but 
also lower unemployment benefits, are further removed from a BI than welfare in the 
1970’s  (Steensland 2007). Many economists assume a BI, especially in the optimal tax 
literature, but do not explicitly advocate for its implementation.  
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The debate re-emerged in the late 90’s. Atkinson (1995, 2011) argues in detail for 
BI together with a categorical transfer, in particular to help the disabled or those with 
children 2 . Murray (2006) proposes replacing all welfare payments in the U.S. by a 
$10,000 p.a. BI combined with a flat tax. Clark and Kavanagh (1996), Fitzpatrick (1999), 
Offe (2008), Standing (2011), Van Parijs and Vanderborght (2012), Skidelsky and 
Skidelsky (2012), and Torry (2013) advocate BI as the best response to growing job-
insecurity and declining real wages for the less skilled, including many issues beyond the 
scope of this paper. In Switzerland a planned referendum will decide on BI in 2015, one 
example of growing political interest in the topic. 
A major advantage of BI is to avoid the poverty trap associated with current 
means-tested welfare systems. These systems generally target the most needy, and are 
withdrawn or phased out quite rapidly as hours worked increase, or when earnings exceed 
some threshold. This means that less-qualified workers, particularly under generous 
European social security systems, may earn little more than they would receive from 
benefits. Even in the US and UK, the very high effective marginal tax rates faced by 
unskilled workers entering employment or moving from part time to full time or higher 
paid work forms a ‘poverty trap’, which is widely seen as a substantial barrier to leaving 
dependency (Atkinson, 2015). The new Universal Credit being introduced in the UK does 
not remove the poverty trap (Hirsch 2015). To overcome this problem Diamond and Saez 
(2011) argue for a wage subsidy or negative income tax for low earners, to ensure their 
net income exceeding benefits for the non-employed, and encourage participation. The 
in-work benefits in the form of tax credits should be rapidly phased out, and the marginal 
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tax should then be low for a broad middle range, but rise substantially for the highest 
earners, to 70–80 % (Piketty and Saez, 2012). This approach, however does not address 
the issue of how to help the non-employed. As a radical alternative BI can eliminate the 
disincentive effect and alleviate poverty for the most needy. 
Assuming homogenous labor and random unemployment Van der Linden (2004) 
and Fabre et al (2014) argue that BI does not raise welfare and would be inferior to 
existing unemployment insurance. As this paper shows, the benefit of BI to the poor is 
mainly due to income redistribution from the rich, which would hardly exist if everyone 
earns the same income. Dolan (2014) points out that Fabre et al (2014) ignore the 
disincentive effects of means–tested welfare payments; also poverty and unemployment 
are highly concentrated among the least qualified, not purely random. Hence their model 
simply removes the main reason for redistributive policies such as BI. Dolan further 
summarizes evidence that the BI’s negative income effect on labor supply would be small 
compared to the positive incentive effect of mitigating the poverty trap. His own 
calculations with US data suggest substantial welfare gains from a modest BI to replace 
most means-tested welfare programs. Gilroy et al (2013) estimate an increased labor 
supply with BI in the German welfare system. 
A crucial decision is the level of BI, and associated taxes. While both right and 
left wing thinkers see certain attractiveness of BI, the former emphasize its replacement 
of current welfare and the latter only agree in various degrees and some worry such 
replacement may hurt the most needy, such as the unemployed. The conventional view 
holds that either the unemployed will be worse off with a modest BI, or unemployment 
will rise due to higher taxes and ‘subsidized idleness’. Thus, while categorical 
 4 
unemployment benefits (UB) have existed for a long time, a universal BI still remains an 
untested and controversial, though increasingly discussed idea, with widely varying 
views on the ‘optimal’ level. We argue instead that a common ground can be found, and 
replacing UB with BI need neither raise unemployment nor hurt the unemployed.   
Rather than addressing all issues, we focus on the welfare effect of replacing UB 
with BI and adopt a modest, incremental policy approach. We start from a given level of 
taxation, UB and (voluntary) unemployment, in a simple model of heterogeneous labor, 
and then evaluate the impacts of replacement of UB with BI. We first assume labor 
supply has only an extensive margin. This is motivated by the empirically dominating 
importance of the participation decision for marginal, low wage workers and inflexibility 
of working hours for most full-time jobs, which are generally determined by job 
requirements, not individual preferences. Given this assumption we show that replacing 
UB with BI can benefit the existing unemployed without raising unemployment. This 
result is, surprisingly, independent of the income distribution, utility functions and 
unemployment levels. Moreover, this replacement also benefits a poor majority of the 
population, and a modified version can even benefit a working majority. This in turn 
suggests a (redistributive) policy reform which could gain a majority vote.3 
Our result also holds in simple cases of involuntary unemployment or joint 
distributions of wages and cost of work. Moreover, even allowing for intensive margins 
(with identical elasticity of labor supply for the entire population), we demonstrate that 
marginal introduction of BI can still benefit most people with lower than the average 
productivity without raising unemployment. We thus recommend the introduction of BI 
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at roughly the same level to replace the current job seekers’ allowance in UK. We further 
discuss BI’s feasibility and other advantages, not included in our model. 
We assume a linear tax, not general (non-linear) optimal benefits and tax rates, as 
reviewed by Diamond and Saez (2011), and neither do we consider ‘optimal’ levels of 
employment. Nor do we address issues of growth and dynamic employment, which are 
obviously beyond the scope of our simple static model.   
The paper is organized as follows. We first describe the main model in Section 1. 
In Section 2 we evaluate the welfare effect of replacing UB with BI given only extensive 
margins. Sections 3 and 4 demonstrate similar outcomes with involuntary unemployment 
and joint distributions of wage and cost of work. In Section 5 we show the result is by 
large still valid even when we allow intensive margins. Section 6 discusses further issues 
beyond our model, and we conclude with section 7. Proofs are in the Appendix.  
1. BASIC MODEL 
We first follow Diamond (1980) and others to ignore intensive margins for full 
time workers. On the other hand, the participation decision for low-wage and part-time 
workers, many of them female, appears to be highly sensitive to financial incentives 
(Diamond and Saez, 2011; Colombino et al 2010; Immervoll et al 2007; Saez, 2002). 
Eissa and Liebman (1996) find that the U.S. Tax Reform Act 1986, which extends tax 
credit to single mothers, has significant impacts on female labor participation, but no 
effect on the working hours of single mothers who were already in the labor force. 
Diamond (1980) and Choné and Laroque (2005 and 2008) developed models of the labor 
market with only extensive margins, assuming hours and earnings are given as part of the 
job ‘package’. The only choice is thus whether to work, at a wage equal to individual 
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productivity, or to rely on transfers. When Colombino et al (2010) use numerical 
simulations to evaluate different welfare systems, they incorporate empirical evidence 
that the elasticity of labor supply is close to zero for full time workers. This approach 
represents a useful approximation and simplification for our purposes.  
We assume an efficient labor market but with voluntary unemployment. The total 
population is normalized to one. We assume fixed working times and effort, leaving only 
the participation decision, given gross earnings and work requirements4. Annual earnings 
reflect workers’ productivity, denoted by y, distributed on [a, b], with 0  a < b, with a 
distribution function F(y) and density function f(y). Given a flat tax t, a worker’s net 
earnings are (1 – t)y. We denote the quantities of BI and UB by B and u. If a person 
works, his income consists of net earnings plus BI,  1y t  + B; if he does not work his 
income is just BI plus UB, B + u. We allow any mixture of BI and UB systems5.  
Given only two choices of working or not, utility can be represented by two 
functions, depending on work status: W[y(1 – t) + B]6 when working and V(B + u) when 
unemployed. Both functions are continuously increasing and concave.7 Since working 
implies less leisure, W(m) < V(m) for any identical income m. A person with earnings x is 
indifferent between working or not when the following equality holds: 
W[x(1 – t) + B] = V(u + B)      (1) 
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5
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6
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7
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This equation is similar to the indifference conditions for the marginal worker in 
Diamond (1980) and Choné and Laroque (2005), with only extensive margins. A person 
chooses to work if and only if his earnings y > x. Given any t, there exists a marginal type 
x, such that all workers with higher earnings prefer employment, while F(x), or those 
with lower earnings, choose not to work. The value of x is determined by (1). This 
assumption will be relaxed in section 4 where costs of work vary for a given productivity 
and are jointly distributed with income. 
We assume that any employed person has a lower marginal utility of income than 
an unemployed, i.e. W’[y(1 – t) + B] < V’(u + B) for any y ≥ x. This is intuitive because 
the former has more income which reduces her marginal utility, and the latter has more 
time which allows more efficient consumption. Given x, the economy’s total output is 
equal to ( )b
x
yf y dy , denoted by Y(x). The tax revenue, tY(x), is used to pay u, B and a 
fixed public expenditure E. So the government budget constraint is: 
 tY(x) = B + uF(x) + E         (2) 
Given t, we may change x, B and u while keeping (1) and (2) equal. If B + u rises, 
the unemployed will be better off. However, the employed may be worse off. Similarly, 
when x is fixed, we can choose the value of any one of three variables t, B and u, and the 
other two will be determined by (1) and (2). We will first show that keeping t constant is 
unlikely to be socially desirable and then we focus on the welfare effect of changing t 
given x, so u and B become functions of t (as well as x)8.  
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For simplicity we consider a flat tax only. This assumption is not crucial. In the 
case of progressive taxes, we can separate the tax structure into two parts, one is a single 
tax rate t applying to all earnings, and the other includes additional marginal tax rates for 
high earners. The latter has no effect on the marginal worker since he only faces t, so (1) 
remains valid. The only change in (2) is additional tax revenue from higher tax rates. If 
we change t but keep other tax rates fixed, the extra revenue does not change and the 
impact on (2) is the same as before. Hence this modification will not change our main 
results obtained below. As we mentioned earlier, our goal is to argue for the superiority 
of BI over UB in the simplest framework, not to find the optimal tax structure. 
2. MAIN RESULTS 
We first show that without increasing tax, replacing UB with BI can only benefit 
the unemployed when it harms everyone else, hence undesirable. The real question then 
is whether such a replacement can be socially beneficial, when tax can be raised, but 
without increasing unemployment. In contrast to the conventional wisdom, we find that 
given x, replacing UB with BI always benefits the unemployed and a poor majority, and 
is utilitarian welfare improving. Moreover, if we allow x to fall, replacing UB can even 
benefit a majority of the employed, without hurting those remaining unemployed, thus 
offering potential political support for BI even when the unemployed have only weak 
‘voice’ in the process. We assume that the current equilibrium is characterized by 
conditions (1) and (2) for given t > 0, u > 0, B ≥ 0, x > a  and F(x) > 0. We first leave t 
constant and change u, while x and B must be adjusted to keep (1) and (2) valid. If B + u 
rises, the unemployed can be better off without any tax increase. Differentiating (1) and 
(2) with respect to u, we obtain the following result (see Appendix A). 
 9 
Proposition 1: Given any fixed t, 
du
dx
 >  0 and 
du
dB
< 0 always, but 
du
dB
 + 1 > 0 if 
and only if (1 tF(x)]> (u + tx)f(x). 
Given t, to increase u we have to raise unemployment and lower basic income, but 
the unemployed may be better off or worse off. If the above inequality does not hold, we 
have dB/du + 1 < 0, so the unemployed are better off if we lower u. This implies a higher 
B and a lower x, hence more employment. A higher B benefits all employed. So replacing 
UB with BI would be a Pareto improvement. Unfortunately, this is unlikely as the 
inequality is usually valid in the real world. For instance, let t = 0.3, F(x) = 0.06, we get 
(1 tF(x)] = 0.66. UK’s job seekers’ allowance (£70 per week) is roughly £3640 
per year. We take the full-time minimum wage earners’ annual income, £11,000 as x, the 
density f(x) is about 1% per £2009. So (u + tx)f(x) = 0.35 < 0.66. Hence, we have dB/du + 
1 > 0. To raise B + u, we have to increase u and x but reduce B (infeasible as current B = 
0). Also this will increase unemployment and hurt all employed. Such a policy to help the 
unemployed does not seem to be socially desirable. Hence we focus on another option: 
increase B + u without raising unemployment, i.e. keeping x constant and increase t.  
There are additional reasons for fixing x. First, as shown above, it can be viewed 
as a modified maximin objective subject to no increase of unemployment. Secondly, a 
given x allows us to evaluate the impact on the fixed group of unemployed, without  
evaluating  the benefit or cost of employment changes. Finally, if a BI is better than pure 
                                                 
9 See: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/percentile-points-from-1-to-99-for-total-income-
before-and-after-tax.  
 10 
UB for a given x, this must hold true when we allow x to change and we will consider this 
case later to show more people can be better off. 
When we raise t without changing x, u and B must adjust to keep (1) and (2) valid. 
We focus on the effect on B + u first. Conventional wisdom suggests that the UB 
reduction is unlikely to be fully compensated by the increase in BI because the latter has 
to be shared by the whole population, and the effect on B + u should depend on the 
income distribution, utility function and level of unemployment. However, we find a 
surprising result that the effect is guaranteed positive (see Appendix B).  
Proposition 2: Given any x, we have 
dt
dB
 >  0, 
dt
du
 <  0 and 
dt
dB
+ 
dt
du
 > 0. 
The intuition that a replacement of UB with BI benefits the unemployed goes as 
follows. When tax rises and UB falls, with fixed x, employment and total output remain 
unchanged given only extensive margins. Thus replacing UB with BI only leads to an 
income redistribution. We can prove it must benefit the unemployed by contradiction. 
Suppose the unemployed are worse off as UB falls, the marginal workers must be worse 
off as well since they obtain the same utility. More productive workers suffer more from 
a higher t because they have to pay more tax, but get same BI, so they must be worse off 
too. Then everyone is worse off. This is impossible, as total output does not change. 
Hence the unemployed must be better off. In Appendix B we also see the benefit is 
proportional to Y(x) – x[1 – F(x)]. It is high given a large income disparity and becomes 
zero given homogeneous labor, as assumed in Van der Linden (2004) and Fabre et al 
(2014). Then, starting with any u and B (including pure UB) the unemployed can be 
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continuously made better off till u falls to zero, i.e. pure BI. Intensive margins will of 
course weaken this result and will be discussed in Section 5. 
Policy makers often consider the impact of higher tax on the working population, 
not only the unemployed. As we mentioned earlier, since the replacement leads to income 
redistribution, it will not benefit everyone. As tax t increases, a worker’s income, y(1 – t) 
+ B rises if and only if dB/dt – y > 0, i.e. when he is sufficiently poor. Hence there is an 
earning level, y*, which divide the population into two groups, one better off and the 
other worse off. This critical y* is equal to dB/dt. As shown in Appendix B, we denote 
the ratio of W’[x(1 – t) + B]/V’(u + B) by . According to our assumption, we have  < 1. 
Proposition 3: Given any x, a worker is better off with a tax increase if and only if 
his earnings are less than y* = )()1(1
)()(
xF
xxFxY   .  
 It is easy to see that y* falls with , and has a minimum of Y(x) +  xF(x) and a 
maximum of Y(x)/[1 – F(x)] as  approaches to 1 and 0 respectively. So y* must lie 
between these two values. Those whose earnings are lower than the former must be better 
off and those whose earnings are higher than the latter, the average earnings of the 
employed, must be worse off. Y(x) +  xF(x) is certainly higher than Y(a), which is the full 
employment output and also the average productivity of the population. Empirical data 
show that average earnings are higher than the median. Hence a majority of the 
population must be better off. This result provides a political justification for the 
replacement of UB with BI based on a majority rule.  
Also, as UB replacement only leads to income redistribution, the net money 
transfer must be zero. Every dollar received by a poor person earning less than y* comes 
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from a rich person earning more than y*. Given the same utility function with decreasing 
marginal utility of income, this type of income transfer hurts a rich person less than it 
benefits a poor one, and must raise utilitarian welfare. Thus we can conclude: 
Proposition 4: Given any x, replacing UB is utilitarian welfare improving.  
 Proposition 3 implies that the replacement hurts one with the average earnings of 
the employed, Y(x)/[1 – F(x)]. However, the replacement may hurt fewer people if we 
allow x to fall. By so doing, we need not raise the tax as much as in the previous case. 
This change will reduce the income transfer to the unemployed, but increase employment 
and total output, and reduce the loss to the rich. If we replace UB by an equal amount of 
BI, the unemployed will be indifferent. (1) and (2) imply that t has to rise and x has to 
fall. As long as we keep u + B constant, we can make more people better off, and 
maximize political support for this equal replacement of UB with BI (Appendix C).  
 Proposition 5: An equal replacement of UB with BI can benefit everyone with 
earnings below Y(x)/[1 – F(x)]. 
 Empirical data indicate that average earnings of the employed are higher than 
median earnings. Hence the replacement can benefit a majority of the employed, without 
hurting the unemployed. This ensures political support even if the decision process 
excludes or gives low weight to the unemployed. The next question is: can such a 
replacement be a Pareto improvement? If yes, we have the strongest argument to 
recommend such a reform. Not surprisingly, the answer is generally negative. If one has 
extremely high earnings, a tiny tax increase will reduce his income so much that cannot 
be compensated by a (relatively small) BI, and must be worse off. However, if top 
earnings are not too high, this argument does not apply and replacing UB with BI may 
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benefit all. To demonstrate such a possibility, we compare two extreme cases: a pure UB 
system with u > 0 and B = 0 vs. a pure BI system with u1 = 0 and B1 > 0. Instead of a 
fixed x, we allow it to fall to x1, as in the case of Proposition 5. So Y(x) rises to Y(x1). The 
budget constraints are tY(x) = uF(x) + E and t1Y(x1) = B1 + E respectively. To minimize 
the tax increase, we keep the remaining unemployed indifferent, i.e. B1 = u. The change is 
a Pareto improvement if the richest are not worse off, i.e. B1 ≥ b(t1 – t), or 
 
b
xY )( 1
 + t
u
xYxY )()( 1 
 ≥  1 – F(x)     (3)  
 
(3) cannot hold if Y(x)/b is close to zero because t[Y(x1) – Y(x)] < u[1 – F(x)]. It 
does hold if Y(x)/b is close to 1 – F(x), though unlikely so as b should be very large.  
Our main results do not depend on the utility function, income distribution or 
initial level of unemployment. The key assumption is the absence of intensive margins 
and emigration of the rich, which may become relevant if taxes were too high. The 
assumption of only voluntary unemployment though, is not crucial, and we will extend 
our model to allow involuntary unemployment and obtain similar results.  
3. INVOLUNTARY UNEMPLOYMENT 
In the previous section, we only consider voluntary unemployment, or non-
employment. In the reality the target of UB is usually the involuntarily unemployed. We 
now show that our main conclusions still hold with involuntary unemployment as the 
replacement will benefit all unemployed, either voluntary or involuntary.  
We assume that a worker with productivity y has a probability p(y) to find a job, 
after presumably optimal search, which we do not model explicitly. The involuntary 
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unemployment is represented by F ≡  bx dyyfyp )()](1[ , and the loss of the total output 
due to involuntary unemployment is Y ≡  bx dyyyfyp )()](1[ . Job search cost amounts 
to a utility loss of (y) for worker y. So a worker is indifferent between searching or not 
when his expected utility of searching, p(y)W[y(1 – t) + B] + [1 – p(y)]V(u + B) – (y) is 
equal to the utility of not searching, V(u + B). Simplifying the equality we obtain the 
condition for the marginal worker x, similar to the previous condition (1): 
 W[x(1 – t) + B] – )(
)(
xp
x
 = V(u + B)     (1’) 
We assume that ratio p(y)/(y) (weekly) rises with y, because more productive 
workers have more chances to find jobs per unit of search cost. Then similar to the earlier 
case, one will search for jobs if and only if his earnings y > x. Therefore, given t, u and B 
there are always a marginal worker x and the associated voluntarily unemployment F(x). 
The corresponding budget constraint (2) is modified due to F and Y as:  
t[Y(x) – Y] = B + u[F(x) + F] + E       (2’) 
 If F and Y are predictable, the government can adjust t, B and u, to keep F(x) 
fixed as before. Hence, given x, higher t again leads to adjustments in u and B according 
to (1’) and (2’). The only difference between (1’) and (1) is the term (x)/p(x), which is 
fixed given x. Likewise, (2’) only differs from (2) due to F and Y, which are also 
fixed. Thus, similar to Propositions 2 and 3, given x, replacing UB with BI will benefit 
the unemployed, either voluntary or involuntary, and everyone whose earnings are not 
higher than Y(x) – Y + x[F(x) + F]. As we argued earlier, this will benefit a poor 
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majority. Moreover, we may keep u + B constant so that x will fall and more people can 
be better off as shown in Proposition 5. By the definition, Y(x) – Y will rise and F(x) + 
F will fall as x decreases. Following the same proof as in Appendix C, we can show that 
an equal replacement of UB with BI can benefit everyone whose earnings are not higher 
than [Y(x) – Y]/[1 – F(x) –  F], which is the average earnings of the employed and 
must be higher than the median earnings of the employed. Hence we have:   
 Proposition 6: With involuntary unemployment, replacing UB with BI can 
benefit a poor majority, and an equal replacement can benefit a poor working majority. 
Due to limited space, we do not examine other results in Section 2. Generally 
speaking replacing UB with BI is still desirable with involuntary unemployment. 
4. JONIT DISTRIBUTIONS 
So far we implicitly assumed an identical cost of work for all. This may not be 
true as people have different costs of work, e.g. due to family circumstances. In this 
section we show that our previous result can be preserved under this situation. Following 
Diamond (1980) and Choné and Laroque (2005) we consider a simple case where ability 
and cost of work are jointly distributed. Earnings are distributed with a density function 
f(y). At each level y, a cost of work c is uniformly distributed in an interval [0, c ]. 
Everyone has a linear utility, only dependent on income and cost of work. Given t, B, and 
u, the utility of a type c worker is y(1 – t) + B – c,  and his utility of not working is u + B. 
So work is preferred if and only if c < y(1 – t) – u. Assuming sufficient earning levels and 
c
 such that 0 < y(1 – t) – u < c  for all y, some choose to work and some do not at any y. 
There is no “marginal worker” for the whole population, but one for each y.  
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The share of the workers with productivity y is [y(1 – t) – u]/ c , their number is 
[y(1 – t) – u]f(y)/ c , and the number of not working is {1 –[y(1 – t) – u]/ c }f(y). The total 
output is (1/ c )  ba dyuytyyf ])1)[(( ; the unemployment  ba dycuytyf }/])1[(1){( = 
F(u,t). The government budget constraint is  
c
t  ba dyuytyyf ])1)[((  = B + uF(u,t) + E    (4)  
Now we raise tax and replace UB with BI keeping unemployment F(u,t) fixed. A 
worker is better off if and only if dB/dt > y. Similar to our results in section 3, we find 
that given t < 0.5, the replacement can benefit the unemployed and everyone with 
earnings no more than ba dyyyf )( , which is the average earnings of the population (see 
Appendix D). It also increases u + B, so the unemployed are better off. Since the average 
earnings are higher than the median earnings of the population, we obtain:  
Proposition 7: With joint distributions of productivity and cost of work, replacing 
UB with BI can benefit a poor majority without changing unemployment.  
Hence it seems desirable to replace UB with BI till t = ½ or u = 0. We should 
notice that this replacement does affect individual employment even though the total 
unemployment is fixed. It increases employment of less productive workers, while 
reduces employment of more productive ones. Consequently the total output will fall. But 
this change can provide extra non-pecuniary benefits. On the one hand unemployment for 
low earners has strong negative effects on (self-reported) well-being, on the other hand, 
highly paid employees often suffer from overwork and lack of leisure time. In this simple 
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case of joint distributions of productivity and cost of work, the total output reduction is 
compensated by this additional gain in wellbeing/happiness.  
5. INTENSIVE MARGINS 
So far we have excluded intensive margins, which would generally weaken our 
conclusions. Nevertheless the key results essentially survive when we allow both 
intensive and extensive margins. We assume a quasi-linear utility function, hence without 
income effects on labor supply, which would generally provide more support for income 
redistribution due to decreasing marginal utility. Instead of a fixed working time, 
everyone can choose his working hours, h, given his disutility function h1+1//(1 + 1/), 
where 0 <  < 1, is the elasticity of labor supply for everyone. Identical elasticity also 
exaggerates the negative impact of intensive margins as the rich and full time workers 
usually have low elasticity, even close to zero. Hence our simple model is less favorable 
to a replacement of UB with BI than a more realistic but complicated approach. 
Workers’ hourly wage w follows a distribution function F(w) and density function 
f(w) on [, ]. Given tax t, an employed receives after-tax earnings wh(1 – t) and B. So 
his utility is wh(1 – t) + B – 
1 1/
1 1/
h  . With optimal labor supply h = [w(1 – t)], his after-
tax earnings are [w(1 – t)], where w is the earnings without tax, and represents his 
productivity. His utility becomes B + 
1
1
w  (1 – t)1+. If unemployed, his income is B + u. 
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So everyone chooses to work if and only if u < [w(1 – t)]/(1 + ).10  Denote the 
marginal worker’s wage by s, we have his indifference condition: 
u = 1 1s  (1 – t)1+       (5) 
Given s, the unemployment is F(s). Given s and t and the total output is (1 – t)
  s dwwfw )(1  = (1 – t)Y(s), where Y(s) is the output without tax,   s dwwfw )(1 . 
Without tax and unemployment, the full employment output, which is also the average 
productivity would be    dwwfw )(1  ≡ Y(). The government budget constraint is  
t(1 – t)Y(s) = B + uF(s) + E      (6)  
We assume the current system only has UB, i.e. u > 0, B = 0, and F(s) > 0. 
Obviously, a pure BI is no longer optimal due to intensive margins 11. We consider who 
will be better off from a marginal introduction of BI given F(s). Unlike the previous 
cases, it will not benefit a person with the average productivity Y(). Nonetheless we 
show that it can benefit everyone with earnings not much less than this level. 
Proposition 8: Given any unemployment level a marginal introduction of BI can 
benefit everyone with productivity w1+ ≤ (1 – 
t
t1 )Y(s) + s1+F(s).  
If  = 0, we obtain the same result as before, the introduction of BI benefits 
everyone whose productivity is below Y(s) + s1+F(s), which is higher than Y(). For any 
                                                 
10
 A realistic fixed cost of work can be introduced, so that only those with at least some positive 
productivity actually work, without changing the basic results. 
11
 In an earlier version of this paper (FitzRoy and Jin, 2010) we show that pure BI is nonetheless better than 
pure UB for the unemployed under reasonable conditions.  
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, the threshold is higher than (1 – 
t
t1 )Y(). We assume the same elasticity for the 
whole population (though it should be much lower for high income earners). In a 
plausible case of  = 0.2 and t = 0.3, the threshold is higher than 0.914Y(). Among all 
OECD countries only Ireland’s ratio (0.916) of the median wage to its mean exceed this 
level and all other country’s ratios are lower than 0.9 in 201312. If these ratios apply to 
the whole population, the threshold is almost certainly higher than the median in most 
countries, and the introduction of BI can benefit a majority13.  
Moreover, if the public expenditure E = 0, then (5) and (6) imply t/(1 – t) = 
s1+F(s)/(1 + )Y(s). Substitute this into the threshold in Proposition 8, we obtain: 
Corollary: If E =  0, given any unemployment level a marginal introduction of BI 
can benefit everyone whose productivity is below Y(s) + s1+F(s)/(1 + ).  
Regardless of the value of , the threshold is higher than Y(s). As Y(s)/[1 – F(s)] is 
the average productivity of the employed, Y(s) is 1 – F(s) of that average. For instance, 
with 10% unemployment, the threshold is higher than 90% of the average wage, 
regardless of how strong the intensive margin is. As we mentioned earlier, the median 
wage is lower than 90% of average wage in all OECD countries except Ireland. Hence 
the introduction of BI may benefit a majority of the working population. If the marginal 
introduction of BI replaces an equal amount of UB allowing unemployment to fall, more 
people can be better off though the unemployed will be kept indifferent. Such a marginal 
replacement is very likely to benefit a poor majority or nearly a majority. 
                                                 
12
 The ratio can be calculated from the ratios of minimum wage to the average and median wage, at OECD 
StatExtracts: http://stats.oecd.org/INdex.aspx?DataSetCode=MIN2AVE. 
13
 The distribution of our productivity, w1+, is close but not identical to that of w. However, due to its 
convexity in w, its mean should exceed its median by even a larger margin.   
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6. FURTHER ISSUES 
(i) Feasibility: Since BI would be received by all citizens, it is often argued that 
its cost would be much higher than existing systems of contingent benefits. Although 
important transfers such as state pensions (and child benefits until recently) are not 
means-tested in the UK, there is a widespread misconception that most cash benefits go 
to the unemployed and lowest earners. However, direct cash transfers to the poorest tenth 
of households are actually smaller than the transfers to the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th deciles – 
only the richest receive substantially less.14  Benefits for the unemployed and lowest 
earners amount to only 6% of total government spending, providing the least generous 
support for the poorest among advanced economies except the US. In the UK total cash 
transfers for welfare (but excluding health-related services such as care for the elderly 
and disabled) are about £205 billion15, while £12 billion unclaimed benefits are recorded 
annually. If this total amount were distributed equally to all citizens, it would provide a 
BI of about £3600 p.a. Coincidentally, this is approximately equivalent to the job-
seeker’s allowance (JSA) of £70 per week. Hence we recommend such a BI to replace the 
current JSA, but with the addition of means–tested housing benefits, due to the 
catastrophic lack of low-cost housing in parts of Britain. This may benefit a majority of 
the working population, while keeping the unemployed at least equally well off, as we 
argued earlier. This BI could provide the average household of 2.2 people with almost 
£8000. A natural modification would be to pay less for children and raise the rate for 
pensioners to the current state pension. It would benefit the poorest who do not even 
                                                 
14
 ONS, The effects of  Benefits and Taxes on Household Income, 2013/14, ‘Table 14, Average incomes, 
taxes and benefits by decile groups of all households, 2013/14’, and Hills (2014). 
15
 Hood and Johnston (2014) 
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claim their entitled benefits. In contrast to JSA it would not be lost for working more than 
16 hours a week, or rejecting unpleasant and low-paid job-offers.  
To overcome political opposition from the ‘squeezed middle’ 16  and alleviate 
growing poverty and deprivation, a substantially higher BI would be needed. This would 
require reform of the tax system to reduce large scale avoidance and evasion by the 
rich17, raise effective marginal rates for highest earners, and thus halt the steady rise in 
the share of GDP appropriated by the top 1%, while real earnings and income for most  
have been declining since 2008 (Piketty and Saez, 2012; Dorling, 2014). A part of BI 
funding can also be covered by significant saving from the administrative cost associated 
with complicated and sometimes inconsistent means-tested welfare programs and various 
taxation or subsidy schemes.   
(ii) Incentives: An unconditional BI would abolish the ‘poverty trap’ faced by low 
earners under means-tested benefit systems. Modest BI and higher marginal tax rates for 
the rich are unlikely to reduce their work incentives, as experience in Scandinavia and 
evidence on labor supply show. There are many benefits associated with reduced 
inequality and deprivation (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). An open question is the 
response of low earners to BI. Gamel et al (2006) recognize two opposing incentives: the 
absence of a poverty trap provides a positive incentive, and the income effect of BI might 
encourage more leisure consumption as a normal good, as low-paid work usually offers 
little job-satisfaction. But their study does not suggest that BI would substantially reduce 
                                                 
16
 A further complication is that total benefits from various uncoordinated programs vary a lot even among 
the poorest households, so that some would lose out under a revenue neutral scheme (Torry, 2015) 
17
 The ‘tax gap’ due to tax avoidance and evasion is estimated by Tax Research UK  to be much higher than 
official claims, at around £120 billion p.a.  http://www.taxresearch.org.uk/Blog 
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labor supply. According to the Dutch CPB report (Ruud de Mooij et al, 2006) based on 
microsimulation, a BI of 550 euro per month in the Netherlands would only reduce 
employment by 3.8%. Similarly small income effects are reported by Dolan (2014). 
Gilroy et al (2013) provide detailed arguments that labor supply would increase with BI 
in place of current welfare in Germany.   
(iii) Freedom: A often neglected aspect is what Van Parijs (1995) called “real 
freedom for all”, and the scope for substitution between job-satisfaction and productivity. 
For example, JSA may be withheld if a claimant voluntarily leaves a job or rejects three 
job offers, say due to poor working conditions, or accepts any work for more than 16 
hours per week, no matter how badly paid. So BI would put pressure on employers to 
provide decent jobs and encourage the poor to leave poverty. It would also eliminate the 
humiliation and widespread hardship caused by growing sanctions on the poorest welfare 
recipients who violate any of the numerous conditions for eligibility. Finally, BI would 
render legal minimum wages, which are often undermined by unpaid overtime or extra 
‘effort’, superfluous. Such a fundamental shift of individual bargaining power, going far 
beyond the best efforts of collective bargainers, would allow the most disadvantaged to 
search without duress for their optimal combination of wages, working time and 
conditions. Some workers with a ‘living’ BI might prefer a combination of lower wages 
and ‘better’ jobs, and employers could benefit from lower labor costs. As Van Parijs and 
Vanderborght (2012) and Standing (2011) have emphasized, this shift of bargaining 
power would generate huge (intangible) welfare benefits for low-wage earners who have 
the worst jobs and least security. Similarly, Groot (2002) convincingly argues that BI is 
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essential for compensatory justice. These dimensions are not included in our model and 
would further strengthen the conclusion obtained here.   
7. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we argue for the superiority of BI over UB. Our model with an 
extensive margin seems to be a reasonable approximation according to the empirical 
evidence, as long as tax rates are not excessive, and the main results are confirmed by a 
simple model with an intensive margin as well. Our findings indicate rather surprising 
advantages of replacing UB with BI, which mitigates the ‘poverty trap’ effect of UB, 
raises income for a given number of unemployed, leads to higher utilitarian welfare and 
benefits a poor majority. Perhaps the most plausible policy is to maintain unemployed 
utility and benefit a majority of the employed, so we suggest replacing JSA by BI of 
similar magnitude. The main conclusion is robust to simple examples allowing for 
involuntary unemployment and a joint distribution of income and cost of work, as well as 
holding in a simple model combining intensive and extensive margins.    
Our simple static model does not consider important issues such as the transition 
process of the replacement, or responses from the demand side of the labor market. Thus 
we recommend an incremental approach in introducing and increasing BI, which allows a 
gradual social and political adjustment. The optimal process and the effects of such a 
gradual withdrawal of categorical benefits, and various social benefits of BI are 
interesting topics. Hopefully, our results will encourage further work using more 
sophisticated models, as a challenge for future research. 
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Appendix A, Proof of Proposition 1: 
Given t we differentiate (1) and (2) with respect to u, and obtain: 
 W’[x(1 – t) + B][(1 – t)
du
dx
 + 
du
dB ] = V’(u + B)(
du
dB
 + 1)   (A.1) 
 tY’(x)
du
dx
 = 
du
dB
 + F(x) + uF’(x)
du
dx
     (A.2) 
Note F’(x) = f(x), and Y’(x) = –xf(x). Dividing both sides of (A.1) by V’(u + B), and 
letting  ≡ W’[x(1 – t) + B]/V’(u + B) < 1, we get [(1 – t)
du
dx
 + 
du
dB ] = 
du
dB
 + 1. 
Combine this with (A.2), we find 
du
dx
 = )())(1()1(
)()1(1
xftxut
xF     > 0 and dudB  =  )())(1()1( )()()()1( xftxut xftxuxFt    < 0.  
Hence 
du
dB
 + 1 > 0 if and only if (1 tF(x)]> (u + tx)f(x). 
Appendix B, Proof of Proposition 2: 
Given x we differentiate (1) and (2) with respect to t, and obtain: 
 W’[x(1 – t) + B](
dt
dB
  x) = V’(u + B)(
dt
dB
 + 
dt
du )   (B.1) 
 Y(x) = 
dt
dB
 + F(x)
dt
du
     (B.2) 
Dividing both sides of (B.1) by V’(u + B), we get (
dt
dB
  x) = 
dt
dB
 + 
dt
du
. Using 
this and (B.2) we get 
dt
dB
 = )()1(1
)()(
xF
xxFxY   > 0 and dtdu  =  )()1(1 )()()1( xF xxFxY     < 0. 
Hence 
dt
dB
+ 
dt
du
=  )()1(1 )](1[)( xF xFxxY    > 0 because Y(x) > xF(x)] always holds. 
Appendix C, Proof of Proposition 5: 
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Now we let x fall to x1, while lowering u to u1. So new B1 > B, and new t1 > t. To 
minimize the tax burden for high-income earners, we keep the unemployed indifferent, 
i.e. u1 + B1 = u + B. We need to show B1 – B > y(t1 – t) for y ≤ Y(x)/[1 – F(x)]. As (2) 
implies B + E = tY(x) – F(x)u and B1 + E = t1Y(x1) – F(x1)u1, we have  
 B1 – B = t1Y(x1) – tY(x) + F(x)u – F(x1)u1   (C.1)  
Since x1 < x, we get F(x1) < F(x). So B1 – B > t1Y(x1) – tY(x) + F(x)(u – u1). But u – u1 = 
B1 – B, so B1 – B > [t1Y(x1) – tY(x)]/[1 – F(x)]. Hence B1 – B > y(t1 – t) if  
 )(1
)()( 11
xF
xtYxYt    > y(t1 – t)   (C.2)  
When y < Y(x)/[1 – F(x)], (C.2) holds if Y(x1) > Y(x), which is guaranteed as x1 < x.  
Appendix D, Proof of Proposition 7:  
Let Y1 ≡ ba dyyyf )( and Y2 ≡ ba dyyfy )(2 . So F(u,t) = 1 + [u – (1 – t)Y1]/ c , and the 
budget constraint is t[(1 – t)Y2 – uY1]/ c  = B + uF(u,t). Differentiating them and holding 
F(u,t) constant, we get du/dt = –Y1, and [(1 – 2t)Y2 – uY1 + tY12]/ c  = dB/dt – Y1F(u,t). 
Substitute u = (1 – t)Y1 + [F(u,t) – 1] c  into the above equality, we find 
 
dt
dB
 = (1 – 2t)
c
YY 212 
 + Y1        (D) 
By their definition, we know Y2 – Y12 =  ba dyyfYy )()( 21  >, so dB/dt > Y1 if t < 0.5. 
Moreover, as du/dt = –Y1, we have du/dt + dB/dt = (1 – 2t)(Y2 – Y12)/ c  > 0.  
Appendix E, Proof of Proposition 8:  
Given s, differentiating (5) and (6) with respect to t, we find that du/dt = –s(1 – t) and 
(1 – t)[1 – (1 + )t]Y(s) = dB/dt + F(s)du/dt. So we solve 
 
dt
dB
 = (1 – t)[1 – (1 + )t]Y(s) + sF(s)(1 – t). 
Since a worker’s net utility is B + 
1
1
w  (1 – t)1+, he is better off if and only if dB/dt > 
w(1 – t), which gives the result in Proposition 8. 
